LOLMgmt: SCCM to Intune - How the Management Plane Became the Attack Surface Nobody’s Watching
Configuration Manager (SCCM and MECM) manages millions of enterprise endpoints and operates on a core assumption: the management plane is trusted. In a production representative lab, we executed a complete attack chain that elevated a low privilege domain user to Full Administrator with code execution across all managed devices. No malware was used and nothing was written to disk. We evaluated the resulting telemetry against 2,886 community Sigma rules. The SCCM specific techniques that enabled the attack produced zero detections.
This talk explains why. The management plane functions as a high privilege trust boundary that the security community has not treated as such. Every step in the attack chain uses legitimate administrative functionality. Understanding why these actions blend in with normal operations is the starting point for building meaningful detection.
We address the detection gap with custom Sigma rules validated against real attack telemetry. However, detection alone is not sufficient. The same attack surface now exists at cloud scale. Intune inherits the same structural trust assumptions, with reduced visibility for many security teams. On March 11, 2026, threat group Handala used Intune’s remote wipe capability to destroy 200,000 Stryker endpoints across 79 countries. No malware was deployed and no EDR alert was generated.
This talk introduces a lightweight posture checker. A dependency free script that performs targeted checks across SCCM and Intune environments and identifies the misconfigurations that enable this attack chain before exploitation. Integrated with SOAR, these checks provide an automated early warning mechanism that surfaces risk before the chain completes.
The broader question is architectural. Centralized management planes create a single point of control and a single point of failure. Detection and posture checks are necessary immediate controls, but they do not address the underlying trust model. This talk examines whether implicit trust in the management plane remains defensible and contributes to the broader discussion on how enterprise endpoint management should evolve.


